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Key findings
State-owned investors make up 18 percent of the Chinese 
M & A transactions examined, and are therefore a minority.  
However, taking into account only the M & A transactions  
that can be assigned to the MIC 2025 sectors, their share 
rises to around 22 percent – a possible indication of state 
stakeholders’ greater interest in acquiring know-how 
abroad for the implementation of MIC 2025.
However, the formal type of ownership of Chinese compa-
nies does not show the full picture of potential state influ-
ence due to the complex interplay between the state and 
companies in China. Therefore, the great challenge for Ger-
many consists in the forms of state influence that are not 
or only insufficiently reflected in the majority ownership 
type of Chinese investors.
“Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025) is the Chinese central  
government’s main industrial policy strategy aimed at 
turning China into the global leader of the fourth industrial  
revolution. Chinese M & A transactions abroad explicitly 
belong to the instruments for implementing MIC 2025.
Germany is an attractive location for Chinese M & A trans- 
actions and offers tailor-made know-how for MIC 2025 due 
to its large number of “hidden champions”, i. e. technolog-
ical world market leaders in highly specialized niches.
64 percent or 112 of the 175 analyzed Chinese M & A trans-
actions with a share of at least ten percent in German com-
panies between 2014 and 2017 percent can be assigned to 
one of the ten key sectors in which China aims to assume 
global technology leadership with the help of MIC 2025.
On the one hand, there is a clear focus on the MIC 2025 
sectors of “energy-saving and new-energy vehicles”, 
“electrical equipment” and “high-end numerical control 
machinery and robotics” – i. e. sectors in which Germany 
can in part demonstrate significant competitive technolog- 
ical advantages. Even before the introduction of MIC 2025  
in 2015, however, these sectors were already a focus of 
interest for Chinese investors in Germany.
On the other hand, key sectors that played little or no 
role for Chinese M & A transactions in Germany have also 
become increasingly important since the introduction of 
MIC 2025. This is particularly evident in the MIC 2025 
sector of “biomedicine and high-performance medical 
devices”.
The majority of the 112 Chinese M & A transactions (just 
under 60 percent) that are relevant for MIC 2025 are dis-
tributed across only three German states: Baden-Württem-
berg (26), North Rhine-Westphalia (22) and Bavaria (18) 
– the very regions in which the majority of the German 
“hidden champions” are located.
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Three recommendations for addressing 
Chinese direct investments
2. Germany and the EU basically have nothing to counter 
China’s industrial policy ambitions. That should change.
The Chinese government is pursuing a clear industrial  
policy strategy by investing in foreign high-tech compa-
nies. Such M & A transactions should help China to rise to 
the top of the world in technology. German companies are 
in the focus here. If there is reason to believe that state 
influence distorts competition, politicians need to act. 
In the case of M & A transactions in strategic sectors such  
as critical infrastructure, serious consideration should  
be given to lowering the threshold for foreign investment 
screening from its current level of 25 percent to ten percent. 
Of course, all interest groups involved should be consulted 
in this process. According to the common international 
definition, a foreign investment above ten percent is con-
sidered a direct investment, with which the investor gener-
ally pursues the goal of obtaining control over the invest-
ment target. 
As discussed previously, it would also make sense to adopt 
a European framework for analyzing and, if necessary, 
screening M & A transactions from third countries, which 
includes dealing with state-owned and state-affiliated 
investors. This may prevent EU states from being played  
off against each other and avoid the undermining of Euro-
pean standards in investment projects. At present, only 
twelve of the 28 Member States have such a screening  
process in place.
In general, a harmonized European position with respect  
to China would be desirable. This is the only way for the  
EU to exert any influence at all on Beijing.
1. Germany needs a differentiated debate on direct 
investment from China, but also from other emerging 
countries.
The public debate on this topic is currently dominated  
by the fear that technology will be “sold off”. In contrast, 
the positive effects of foreign direct investment are often 
ignored. Direct investments from China and other countries 
create jobs, bring capital into the country and contribute 
to tax revenue. Chinese investors also improve integration 
with the Chinese market, which is important for Germany. 
Compared to financial investors from other countries,  
Chinese companies have a long-term interest in the M & A 
transactions and in some cases offer location guarantees. 
In the past, they have also rescued German companies from 
insolvency.
A fundamental culture of openness and welcoming with 
respect to foreign investors, regardless of where they come 
from, must be maintained and possibly even strengthened. 
This is because Germany as a globalized economic location 
needs foreign direct investment.
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3. Germany and the EU should demonstrate determination 
and self-confidence in addressing the issue of lack of 
reciprocity in economic relations with China.
Germany, like the other EU states, offers Chinese inves- 
tors free market access and has no extensive protection 
mechanism for key technologies. In contrast, the Chinese 
government has deliberately protected strategic industries 
from foreign access to date. In short: A Chinese KUKA, if 
there were one, would never fall into foreign hands. Almost 
17 years after China joined the WTO, there is still no level 
playing field in mutual economic relations.
This is where Trump’s trade policy could play into the 
hands of Germany and the EU: as dangerous as the trade 
war provoked by Trump may be, it clearly shows how 
dependent China still is on Western know-how. The EU 
could take advantage of this situation. Instead of resorting 
to protectionist measures, the EU could position itself as 
a more reliable partner for China than the United States – 
and thus ensure that its demands are heard in Beijing. 
First on this list is the conclusion of the bilateral invest-
ment treaty that has been under negotiation since 2014. 
This could be an important step towards fair competitive 
conditions between Chinese and European, and thus also 
German, companies in China.
In times of increasing global protectionism, both China 
and the EU are more dependent than ever on reliable part-
nerships. It should therefore be in both sides’ interests to 
actively promote the maintenance of an international rule-
based economic order. 
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1 Introduction 
state-led systematical acquisitions of German key technol-
ogies and of market competition thus being distorted, for 
example through politically subsidized purchase prices for 
German companies. 
Secondly, there is a lack of reciprocity between China and 
Germany or the EU: while Chinese companies can go on a 
“shopping spree” in Germany without significant restric-
tions, the Chinese government deliberately protects stra-
tegic industries from foreign access. In short: A Chinese 
Kuka, if there were one, would not fall into foreign hands.
Germany is facing a dilemma here: as a major export 
nation, it advocates open markets like hardly any other 
country and welcomes foreign investors in principle. How-
ever, the aforementioned uncertainties associated with  
Chinese M & A transactions have led Germany to tighten  
its legislation for the screening of foreign M & A trans- 
actions. A 2017 amendment to the German Foreign Trade 
Ordinance [Außenwirtschaftsverordnung] granted the  
German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
[Bundeswirtschaftsministerium] (12 July 2017) more pow-
ers in this area, for example with regard to critical infra-
structure – but still only above the level of a 25 percent  
stake. Cases such as the planned investment by the Chinese 
state-owned State Grid Corporation of China in the net- 
work operator 50Hertz thus remain below the radar of  
legislators. State Grid wanted to acquire a 20 percent  
stake – i. e. well below the threshold relevant for screen-
ing. The plan ultimately failed formally because the Belgian 
majority shareholder Elia exercised its pre-emptive right 
(Welt, 23 March 2018). However, the debate about how to 
deal with Chinese M & A transactions in Germany, especially 
in key technologies, continues.
The main goal of this study is to compare these M & A 
transactions with China’s high-tech strategy “Made in 
China 2025”. This primarily involves providing an overview 
of the Chinese M & A transactions that can be categorized as 
The robotics manufacturer Kuka, the automotive supplier  
Finoba, and the pharmaceutical company Bendalis – three  
companies from very different sectors, yet with two things  
in common (see table in the annex): firstly, they are major-
ity-owned by Chinese investors, and secondly, their respec- 
tive technology fits into China’s industrial policy strategy 
“Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025). This strategy defines 
ten key sectors in which China aims to become a global 
leader in the first half of the 21st century, including robot-
ics, e-cars and computer-controlled machines. Chinese 
M & A transactions abroad explicitly belong to the instru-
ments for implementing “Made in China 2025”.
Germany has a wealth of technological know-how that  
is relevant to the ten MIC 2025 sectors. It is therefore not 
surprising that Chinese direct investments in Germany, 
including an increasing number of M & A transactions (see 
table in annex), have risen in recent years. After German 
companies invested considerably more in China than  
Chinese companies did in Germany for decades, the situ-
ation changed for the first time in 2017: According to the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Germany that year was signifi-
cantly higher than German FDI in China (Figure 1). That is 
also due to the fact that German companies continue to face 
restrictions and discrimination in comparison to Chinese 
companies. Their investment activities in China are there-
fore more conservative (German Chambers of Commerce 
Abroad, 16 November 2017).
These developments have led to a partly very critical debate 
on Chinese investment in Germany, particularly M & A 
transactions, in politics, business and the public. Two 
aspects are the main focus here (see, for example: Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen, 10 March 2018; BDI 2017; Gabriel 2016): 
Firstly, there is the question of the political influence on 
these M & A transactions: it is unclear what role the Chinese 
government plays in this. This is accompanied by fears of 
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falling under this industrial policy strategy. However, the 
analysis cannot provide any evidence as to whether these 
M & A transactions are actually politically motivated.
Below, we begin with a brief summary of China’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI), especially in Germany. Next, we 
will categorize the 175 total Chinese M & A transactions in 
German companies from 2014 to 2017 according to the ten 
key sectors listed in MIC 2025. This will enable us to put 
forward suggestions for how to possibly handle Chinese 
M & A transactions in the future.
FIGURE 1: FDI flows between China and Germany, 2004–2017 (in USD million)
 German FDI in China  Chinese FDI in Germany
Sources: German FDI in China from 2004–2015: Statistical Year Book of China, various years; for 2016 and 2017:  
MOFCOM, 4 February 2017 and MOFCOM, 29 January 2018. Chinese FDI in Germany from 2004–2010: MOFCOM et al. 2011;  
from 2011–2015: MOFCOM et al. 2016; for 2016 and 2017: MOFCOM et al. 2017 and MOFCOM, 1 February 2018.	
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2 Comet-like rise:  
 China as a foreign investor
ble in sufficient quality or quantity, or the market is satu-
rated (Jungbluth 2015: 40–43).
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to see the com-
et-like rise of China as a foreign investor in recent years. 
According to data from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the country was the 
second largest foreign investor worldwide in 2016: USD 
183 billion or 12.6 percent of global FDI flows came from 
China in that year. In 2006, the figure was just under USD 
18 billion, only 1.3 percent. Since then, China’s annual FDI 
has increased almost tenfold, leaving all other emerging 
countries far behind in this respect (Figure 2). For com-
parison: India invested just USD five billion abroad in 2016. 
This represents 0.4 percent of global FDI flows.
The situation is different for FDI outward stock, i. e. the 
cumulative foreign direct investments: in 2016 China held 
about five percent of global FDI outward stock at around 
USD 1.3 trillion, putting it in 10th place worldwide (Fig-
ure 3). If FDI outward stock is viewed in relation to gross 
domestic product (GDP), it becomes clear that China still 
has considerable catch-up potential here – especially  
in comparison with important foreign investors such as 
the United States or Germany: China’s FDI outward stock 
total just 11.3 percent of its economic output. This metric is 
33.3 percent for the United States, and even around 40 per-
cent for Germany (UNCTAD 2017a and 2017b). 
It can therefore be assumed that China’s direct investments 
abroad will continue to increase in coming years. According 
to a projection by Prognos AG on behalf of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, China could already be investing USD 288 billion 
abroad in 2025. Around USD 4.3 billion of this could go to 
Germany (Jungbluth 2016: 5).
Direct investments from China have been an essential part 
of the reform agenda since the announcement of the Going 
Global strategy in 2000. These investments were heavily  
regulated beforehand. The political focus was on direct 
investments by foreign companies in China. In the mean-
time, the Chinese government has been using the Going 
Global strategy to promote the “reverse direction” for 
almost 20 years, i. e. to encourage the international expan-
sion of Chinese companies in the form of FDI, among other 
things. The main goal of the strategy is to promote China 
as an economy and Chinese companies in the global value 
chains. This means that China will no longer be just the 
“factory of the world”, but also increasingly become the 
“research laboratory of the world”. This should be accom-
panied, for example, by indigenous innovation and patents  
as well as original Chinese “global players”, i. e. Chinese 
Samsungs, Siemens or Sonys. In the 21st century, accord- 
ing to the Chinese government’s vision, the label “Made  
in China” should no longer stand for cheap products for  
the masses, but rather for high-quality innovative products  
(Jungbluth 2015: 183–184). Although the government has 
again tightened FDI in certain areas in recent years due  
to capital controls, its fundamental commitment to FDI by 
Chinese companies remains unbroken as an important fac-
tor in the country’s economic development (see, for exam-
ple, Xi, 18 October 2018). 
Leaving aside political strategies, the corporate level is a 
central driving force for FDI from China. Many Chinese 
companies, like companies from other countries, are now 
pursuing their own internationalization strategy. They are 
looking for access to sales markets, technologies and qual-
ified employees abroad. In addition, Chinese companies 
have also begun to relocate their production to other coun-
tries, as labor cost in China is rising rapidly. From the per-
spective of economic history, it is frequently observed that 
companies expand abroad when their competitiveness and 
financial strength have reached a certain level, certain pro-
duction factors on their home market are no longer availa-
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FIGURE 3: FDI outward stock of selected countries, 2000–2016 (USD million)
 USA  United Kingdom  Japan  Germany  China  France
Source: UNCTAD 2017d	
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FIGURE 2: FDI outflows from selected countries, 2000–2016 (USD million)
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3 Top target in Europe:  
 Chinese direct investments in Germany
of Chinese investments that have Germany as their final 
target is therefore likely to be higher than recorded in the 
official national statistics. 
This also applies to Chinese FDI stock in Germany. They 
totaled USD 7.8 billion in 2016, landing them in 4th place  
in the EU and 13th place worldwide. Only 0.6 percent of 
China’s total FDI stock are therefore attributable to Ger-
many (Figure 5). 
According to Chinese statistics, Chinese investors are focus- 
ing on manufacturing, leasing and business service as well 
Germany was the main target country for Chinese direct 
investments in Europe and the eighth largest recipient of 
Chinese FDI worldwide in 2016. Nevertheless, Germany 
only accounted for USD 2.4 billion or 1.2 percent of China’s 
total FDI flows that year. The lion’s share of the country’s 
direct investments continue to go to its Asian neighborhood 
(Figure 4). 
However, the “Hong Kong factor” must be taken into 
account for the regional distribution (see Jungbluth 2016: 
40): Chinese companies also invest through their subsidiar-
ies in Hong Kong or other countries abroad. The share  
FIGURE 4: Regional distribution of Chinese FDI flows, 2016 (in percent)
Source: MOFCOM et al. 2017	
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FIGURE 5: Regional distribution of Chinese FDI outward stock, 2016 (in percent)
FIGURE 6: FDI stock in Germany by region of origin, 2016 (in percent)
Source: MOFCOM et al. 2017	
Note: Based on primary and secondary FDI stock in Germany (consolidated)  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2018 
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as scientific research and technical service (MOFCOM et al. 
2017: 30). 
The official statistics published by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank [German Federal Bank] confirm the from a macro- 
economic perspective relatively low quantity of Chinese 
direct investments in Germany: in 2016, Chinese companies 
held EUR 2.2 billion, only 0.4 percent of the direct invest-
ment stock in Germany (Figure 6).1 
Even if all the EUR 1.3 billion of Hong Kong FDI stock in 
Germany were attributed to companies from the People’s 
Republic of China due to the “Hong Kong factor”, the Chi-
nese share of FDI stock would still only be 0.7 percent. 
Japan continues to be the largest Asian investor in Germany 
with EUR 19.8 billion. This represents four percent of FDI 
stock in Germany. In contrast, German companies have 
invested some EUR 76 billion in China to date. This repre-
sents around seven percent of Germany’s global FDI stock 
in 2016. A clear quantitative asymmetry can therefore still 
be seen in mutual investment relations. 
Regardless of the data source used, Chinese FDI stock  
in Germany have increased significantly in recent years: 
Both the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Chinese MOFCOM 
assume that Chinese FDI stock in Germany almost doubled 
in just three years from 2013 to 2016. 
In the course of this development, the M & A transactions 
that Chinese companies have made in German compa-
nies have also increased sharply. According to our research, 
there were at least 47 such M & A transactions in Germany 
in 2017 with at least a ten percent stake – M & A trans- 
1 The considerable differences between FDI stocks in German and  
Chinese national statistics have been observed for years and are  
heavily discussed. The possible reasons for this are: different survey-
ing and reporting methods, different publication dates, etc. For more 
details, see the statistical explanatory notes in Jungbluth 2016: 37–40.
actions above this threshold are considered direct invest-
ments, with which the investor pursues the “objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest and control” according to the 
international standard definition (Jungbluth 2016: 37). 
For comparison: the consulting firm EY reports a total of 
25 Chinese M & A transactions in Germany, i. e. roughly  
half, in 2013 (EY 2014: 5).2 
However, the majority of Chinese investment projects in 
Germany continue to take the form of so-called greenfield 
investments and expansion investments. This means that 
Chinese companies establish their own sales companies, 
factories, research and development centers, etc. or expand 
existing company structures “on a greenfield”. In this way, 
they create new assets, for example in the form of jobs,  
and contribute to tax revenue. According to preliminary 
figures from Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), there were 
147 Chinese greenfield and expansion projects in Germany 
in 2017, about three times more than M & A transactions 
(German Parliament [Bundestag], 7 March 2018: 3).
Although greenfield investments predominate in terms  
of the number of Chinese investment projects in Germany,  
most of them are under the radar. As described at the 
beginning, public attention is primarily focused on Chinese  
M & A transactions. This is connected with the fact that 
M & A transactions in companies involve the takeover of 
existing assets (technology, jobs, property and land, etc.), 
and the total investment is generally considered to be sub-
stantially higher than for greenfield investments (Jungbluth 
2016: 27–28). This combination underpins the fear that 
Chinese investors, possibly politically subsidized, may take 
over German high-tech companies, leading to a systematic 
technological “sell-off” of German national interests. 
2 The information on Chinese investments in Germany discussed above 
is based on publicly available information and does not claim to be 
complete. For more details, see Jungbluth 2016: 40 and the table with 
the 175 Chinese investments analyzed here in the annex.
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Beyond this sometimes controversial debate and the seem-
ingly small quantity of Chinese FDI in Germany, it remains 
a fact that Germany has become an important target coun-
try for direct investments from China in recent years and 
will remain so in future. There are fundamentally two rea-
sons for this: access to key technologies and know-how as 
well as access to the German and European markets. 
On account of its industrial and corporate structure, Ger-
many, whose own digitization initiative called Industry 4.0 
was an important model for MIC 2025 (Petersen / Jungbluth 
2018: 145), fits into both the internationalization strategies 
of Chinese companies and the Chinese government’s indus-
trial policy strategy “Made in China 2025”. A key factor in 
the analysis of Chinese FDI in Germany is therefore less its 
quantity than its quality.
16
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Task “6. Promoting development breakthrough in ten key 
areas” also lists the ten often cited key sectors in which 
China wants to become a global technology and innovation 
leader in future: 
1. Next-generation information technology
2. High-end numerical control machinery and robotics 
3. Aerospace and aviation equipment
4. Maritime engineering equipment and high-tech  
maritime vessel manufacturing 
5. Advanced railway equipment
6. Energy-saving and new-energy vehicles
7. Electrical equipment
8. Agricultural machinery and equipment
9. New materials 
10. Biomedicine and high-performance medical devices.  
In the core areas central to these sectors, China, by 2025,  
is to substantially “expand its market share of its own 
intellectual property rights [...], significantly reduce its 
dependence on foreign countries [...] and [...] reach a lead-
ing international level” (State Council, 8 May 2015). 
MIC 2025 also lays out under Task “9. Increasing level of 
internationalization in the industrial sector” that direct 
investments abroad should explicitly be part of the strategy 
in order to achieve these goals in the near future: “Compa-
nies should be supported in making acquisitions, invest-
ments in companies, founding start-ups and setting up 
research and development centers, testing facilities and 
global sales and service systems abroad” (ibid.).
In the following, we will therefore analyze the extent to 
which Chinese M & A transactions in Germany match the 
MIC 2025 sector catalogue. We will also discuss the sec-
tor distribution, the formal type of ownership of Chinese 
investors and the regional distribution of these M & A trans-
actions within Germany.
4 “Made in China 2025”: Industrial policy  
 for the fourth industrial revolution
Through an active industrial policy, China aims to use the 
fourth industrial revolution (digitization) to become a global 
leader in the key industries of the future. Digitization affects 
almost all areas of the economy and life and thus changes 
the foundations of international competitiveness. Tradi-
tional competitive advantages, technologies and business 
models are becoming obsolete. New ones are being created 
at a speed that far exceeds the three preceding industrial 
revolutions (mechanization, automation, computerization) 
(for more details in this regard, see Schwab 2016). In the 
course of these global upheavals, China aims to shed its role 
as an original equipment manufacturer for Western compa-
nies, and become a leading technology and innovation loca-
tion worldwide in the first half of the 21st century. 
The strategy “Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025), announced 
by the Chinese government in May 2015, is intended to lay 
the foundation for this. It defines a clear goal: “[...] By the 
100th anniversary of the founding of the New China, we 
want to build our country into an industrial powerhouse 
leading the development of the global industrial sector” 
(State Council, 8 May 2015). In order to achieve this, China 
wants to catch up with the industrialized countries by 2025, 
and overtake them by 2049. The top priorities are found in 
nine “strategic tasks and focal points”:
1. Increasing the innovative capacity of local industry
2. Deepening the integration of informatization and  
industrialization
3. Strengthening the industrial base
4. Improving product quality and developing own brands
5. Nationwide implementation of environmentally friendly 
production 
6. Promoting development breakthrough in ten key areas
7. Promoting in-depth restructuring in the industrial sector
8. Actively developing service-oriented production and 
product-oriented service
9. Increasing the level of internationalization in the  
industrial sector
17
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4.1 Chinese M & A transactions are pre- 
dominantly in line with “Made in China 2025”
Our analysis covers 175 Chinese M & A transactions in  
Germany between 2014 and 2017 with a stake greater than 
ten percent. A total of 124 of them or 71 percent, accord-
ing to our information, are majority-owned (investment 
of > 50 percent) by Chinese investors. A detailed list of all 
M & A transactions and graphs for the analysis of the indi-
vidual years from 2014 to 2017 can be found in the annex.
The ten key sectors of MIC 2025 are clearly the focus of 
Chinese M & A transactions in Germany: The vast major-
ity, namely 112 or 64 percent of the analyzed Chinese M & A 
transactions can be assigned to one of these sectors. At 
74 percent, the share of the majority-owned M & A trans- 
actions is somewhat higher than the overall average. In MIC 
2025 sectors, Chinese investors seem to be striving even 
more strongly for majority control of the acquired compa-
nies than in other sectors.  
The majority of the 112 M & A transactions that match MIC 
2025 (79 M & A transactions or 71 percent) are concentrated 
among four sectors (Figure 7):
1 Energy-saving and new-energy vehicles  
(23 M & A transactions)
2 Electrical equipment (21 M & A transactions)
3 Biomedicine and high-performance medical devices  
(18 M & A transactions)
4 High-end numerical control machinery and robotics  
(17 M & A transactions) 
This is not surprising at first since these are also the areas  
in which Germany is economically and technologically 
strong and internationally successful. As a result, the 
machine tool sector and the automotive industry in par-
ticular attracted Chinese investors long before MIC 2025 
was announced (for the years 2001–2013 see Emons 2013: 
19–20; Jungbluth 2013: 13; Strack and Schwarzer 2014: 3; 
Wassner 2015: 5). However, two observations are interest-
ing: 
Firstly, the number of M & A transactions that can be allo-
cated to the MIC 2025 sectors has increased significantly 
since the strategy was announced: it was over 70 percent  
for 2016 and 2017, whereas in the year MIC 2025 was 
announced and the year prior to that, it was only just over 
50 percent. 
FIGURE 7: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany fitting the 10 key sectors of MIC 2025, 2014-2017 (in percent)
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
64.0% Yes, fits MIC 2025 
36.0% No, does not fit MIC 2025 
  MIC 2025: 
112 M&A transactions
 20.5% Energy-saving and 
new energy vehicles
 18.8% Electrical equipment 
 16.1% Biomedicine and high-
performance medical devices 
15.2% High-end numerical control 
machinery and robotics 
 8.0% Next-generation information 
technology 
 6.3% Aerospace and aviation 
equipment
 5.4% New materials 
 4.5% Advanced railway equipment 
 2.7% Maritime engineering 
equipment and high-tech 
maritime vessel manufacturing 
 1.8% Agricultural machinery 
and equipment 
175 M&A transactions
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Secondly, greater diversification in the ten key sectors can 
be seen from 2015 onwards. While Chinese M & A trans-
actions in Germany concentrated on a total of six of these 
sectors in 2014, M & A transactions are found in almost all 
sectors in the following years. Particularly striking is the 
great interest of Chinese investors in the area of biomedi-
cine and high-performance medical devices. This can only 
be observed from 2015 onwards, i. e. the year in which MIC 
2025 was announced. Previously, this sector played basi-
cally no role (in this regard, also see Jungbluth 2016: 31). 
Against the backdrop of the complex interplay between  
the state and companies in China,3 two explanations are 
conceivable here: 
On the one hand, industrial policy strategies such as MIC 
2025 generally create incentives for Chinese companies to 
invest in the politically desirable sectors, whether at home 
or abroad, through appropriate subsidy measures. 
On the other hand, it can be assumed, in particular with 
FDI, that companies can expect easier implementation 
if their investment project fits into the strategy. This is 
because FDI from China is still subject to certain restric-
tions, some of which have been tightened again in the last 
two years due to greater capital controls (MERICS 2018). 
The approval procedure for foreign M & A transactions has 
been greatly liberalized and has now been largely converted 
into a registration system (Jungbluth 2016: 14–16). Never-
theless, FDI for Chinese companies involves a considera-
ble amount of bureaucracy. Furthermore, access to foreign 
exchange is also regulated. 
The Chinese government therefore has sufficient leverage to 
steer FDI from China in a politically desired direction – irre-
spective of the formal type of ownership of the companies.
3 For an in-depth discussion of China’s political and economic system, 
see: Heilmann 2016: 220–222; Jungbluth 2015: 31–37.
4.2 Formal type of ownership: State-owned 
investors are in the minority
The previously mentioned ties between the state and  
companies in China mean that Chinese investors’ formal 
form of ownership cannot fully answer the question of the 
much-discussed potential influence of the Chinese govern- 
ment. However, the analysis shows the investors that are 
(can be) at least formally under this influence. We distin-
guish between private and state-owned companies as well 
as companies that are directly controlled by the State owned  
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
and thus the central government in Beijing. 
Almost two-thirds, and thus the overwhelming majority, 
of the 175 Chinese M & A transactions analyzed here were 
made by companies which are majority privately owned 
(> 50 percent) (Figure 8). 18 percent of the cases involve 
state-owned investors, with eight percentage points being 
attributable to SASAC companies. 
However, if only the 112 M & A transactions that can be  
assigned to the ten MIC 2025 sectors are taken into account,  
the state’s share is to some extent higher at around 22 per-
cent. SASAC companies account for nine percentage points 
of this figure, which is also slightly higher than the over-
all average. This suggests greater political interest in these 
sectors. Nevertheless, state-owned investors are formally 
in a minority when it comes to Chinese M & A transactions 
in Germany.
Therefore, the great challenge for Germany consists in the 
forms of state influence that are not or only insufficiently 
reflected in the majority ownership type of Chinese inves-
tors. These range from mixed private-state forms of own-
ership (hunhe suoyouzhi) to party-state organizations in 
companies or opaque financing structures and numerous 
informal ties that constitute a black box for outsiders and 
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especially for foreigners (in this regard, see Wübbeke 2016: 
51–54; Jungbluth 2016: 35–36). 
4.3 Regional distribution: Baden-Württem- 
berg and North Rhine-Westphalia in front
77 of the analyzed Chinese M & A transactions, i. e. 44 per-
cent, are located in solely two German federal states: 39 
in Baden-Württemberg and 38 in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW). Of which 26 and 22 fit the MIC 2025 sectors. In  
both German states, the focus is particularly on energy- 
saving and new-energy vehicles, biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices, and high-end numerical  
control machinery and robotics. Electrical equipment also 
plays a prominent role in Baden-Württemberg. Bavaria  
follows in third place with 26 Chinese M & A transactions.  
18 of these can be assigned to MIC 2025, with a similar sec-
tor focus as in NRW and Baden-Württemberg (Figure 9).
Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria 
are also the three federal states with the highest number 
of so-called “hidden champions” in Germany (Hermann 
2007, cited according to Baden-Württemberg, without 
year). These are medium-sized companies, often unknown 
to the public, which are world market leaders in their tech-
nological niches. This type of company has been a particular  
focus of Chinese M & A transactions in Germany for years 
(Emons 2013). 
The three German states mentioned are also the states  
in which the most patents were applied for in 2017 (in 
comparison to other German states; German Patent Office 
2018). Patent applications are not to be equated with inno-
vative ability, but at least they demonstrate that research 
and development activities are a focal point in these loca-
tions – and that these states are apparently particularly 
attractive for Chinese M & A transactions. Christian Rus-
che (2017) also shows that there is a strong connection 
here: According to Rusche, Chinese investors are investing 
in German states “where the patent application intensity is 
high”. The focus of the MIC 2025 sectors on highly special-
ized technologies will probably ensure that Chinese com-
panies will continue to be very interested in German com-
panies. 
Overall, the focus of Chinese investors is clearly on the 
West of the Republic: Solely 18 of the 175 M & A transactions  
(10.3 percent) went to the five new German states and 
FIGURE 8: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany by type of ownership of investor, 2014–2017 (in percent)
SASAC = State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of the People‘s Republic of China
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex. 	
 64.0% private 
 17.7% n/a 
10.3% state-owned 
 8.0% state-owned (SASAC) 
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FIGURE 9: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany by federal state, 2014–2017
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex. 	
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twelve of them were in MIC 2025 sectors. Most of them 
were in Saxony (6; MIC 2025 = 4) and Thuringia (6; MIC 
2025 = 2). Possible reasons for this could be, among others, 
the differences in the economic structure and development, 
as well as access to technologies and skilled workers.
In general, the 16 German states – just like the economic 
location of Germany itself – offer foreign investors an open 
investment environment, irrespective of their country of 
origin. This is because FDI can have positive effects for 
the German states in the form of jobs, tax revenue and an 
increase in international ties. German states are also fac-
ing direct competition with each other in attracting FDI 
and pursue an active location policy through their invest-
ment promotion agencies.4 The main focus is on greenfield 
investments. However, foreign M & A transactions in com-
panies are also generally seen as neutral to positive, if this 
is connected with maintaining a location. In future, how-
ever, dealing with potential state influence on such M & A 
transactions could also become a major issue for the Ger-
man states, especially in connection with unfair competi-
tive conditions for their domestic companies in China or  
in Germany vis-à-vis state-financed Chinese investors. 
4 See, for example, the websites of the following investment  
promotion agencies: Baden-Württemberg: http://www.bw-invest.de;  
Hamburg: http://www.hamburg-invest.com; North Rhine- 
Westphalia: https://www.nrwinvest.com/de/startseite;  
Saxony: https://standort-sachsen.de/de/investoren   
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5 Outlook: Fair framework for mutual 
investments necessary
Germany is an attractive location for foreign direct invest-
ments due to its business and economic structure. Regard-
less of investors’ country of origin, it offers an open invest-
ment environment and generally welcomes FDI. In recent 
years, however, the rapidly increasing number of M & A 
transactions from China has led to a controversial discus-
sion about Germany’s openness as a business location.  
Primarily, there is fear of a state-orchestrated transfer  
of technology to China.
In fact, a clear focus of Chinese M & A transactions in Ger-
many is on the ten key sectors defined in “Made in China 
2025” (MIC 2025). MIC 2025 is the main industrial policy  
strategy aimed at making China the global leader of the 
fourth industrial revolution. M & A transactions abroad are 
explicitly one of the instruments to implement MIC 2025. 
64 percent or 112 of the 175 analyzed Chinese M & A trans-
actions with a stake of at least ten percent in German com-
panies between 2014 and 2017 match one of the ten key 
sectors in which China aims to assume global technology  
leadership with the help of MIC 2025. The focus is on  
specialized segments of the automotive and machine tools, 
in which Germany in part has significant technological  
competitive advantages. Even before the introduction of 
MIC 2025 in 2015, therefore, these sectors were already a 
focus of interest for Chinese investors in Germany. Since 
the introduction of MIC 2025, however, the importance 
of MIC 2025 key sectors, which had previously played no 
role or only a minor role in Chinese M & A transactions, 
has also increased. This is particularly evident in the MIC 
2025 sector of “biomedicine and high-performance medi-
cal devices”.
Formally, there is no concentration of state-owned com-
panies: state-owned investors make up 18 percent of the 
Chinese M & A transactions analyzed and are therefore a 
minority. If we only take into account the M & A trans- 
actions that can be assigned to the MIC 2025 sectors, how-
ever, their share rises to around 22 percent – a possible 
indication of state-owned stakeholders’ greater interest in 
acquiring know-how abroad for the implementation of MIC 
2025. Moreover, mixed types of ownership with state and 
private ownership play an important role in China. Even 
in the case of companies that are majority privately owned 
formally, the state may exercise influence. 
Furthermore, the formal type of ownership of Chinese 
companies does not show the full picture of potential state 
influence due to the complex interplay between the state 
and companies in China. The informal ties through net-
works, party structures and other channels are not reflected 
in this. These forms of state influence represent a particu-
larly great challenge for Germany, as it is difficult in such 
cases to find a solution that is consistent with international 
principles such as non-discrimination. Moreover, Chinese 
and other foreign investors should not gain the impression 
that they are generally no longer welcome in Germany.
Germany should therefore concentrate on three areas when 
dealing with Chinese FDI: 
Firstly, it should maintain its basic culture of openness  
for foreign investors, regardless of their country of origin. 
FDI exerts positive effects, for example in the form of job 
creation, and contributes to Germany’s international inte-
gration.
Secondly, political support for this openness makes sense in 
order to prevent a naive sell-off under unfair competitive 
conditions. The implementation of the proposal to lower 
the stake threshold for screening foreign M & A transactions 
has been discussed in public since February 2018 and is a 
possible measure (Handelsblatt, 14 February 2018). The 
current threshold is 25 percent. However, ten percent would 
be conceivable, since a direct investment begins here, with 
which the investor’s expects to gain a controlling interest 
in a company, according to the international standard defi-
nition. Some EU members states currently even screen for-
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eign takeovers already starting from a stake of five percent 
(European Commission 2017: 3). In this respect, Germany 
is in the middle when compared to other EU countries. In 
addition, a common European framework for analyzing and 
screening of foreign M & A transactions from third countries 
that includes dealing with state-owned and state-affiliated  
investors would be useful. At present, only twelve of the 
28 Member States have such a screening mechanism in 
place. 
Thirdly, Germany and the EU should work resolutely and 
self-confidently on fair framework conditions in mutual 
investment relations with China, i. e. for the establishment 
of the much-cited reciprocity. In a globalized world, China 
is at least as economically dependent on Germany as Ger-
many is on China. The conclusion of the EU-China Invest-
ment Treaty that has been under negotiation since 2014  
is the first measure to be mentioned here. This could be  
an important step towards reciprocity.
In times of increasing global protectionism, both China 
and the EU are more dependent than ever on reliable part-
nerships. It should therefore be in both sides’ interests to 
actively promote the maintenance of an international rule-
based economic order. 
24
Is China Systematically Buying Up Key Technologies? 
Chinese M & A transactions  
between 2014 and 2017 
Annex
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Chinese M &  A transactions in Germany between 2014 and 2017
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
2017: 47 transactions
Biotest Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Creat Group Private 89.9 1,300.0 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Curasan Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Chindex / Fosun  
International
Private 25.0 2.3 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Elexxion Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Shanghai Tianying  
Medical Instruments
n / a 55.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Metrax Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Jiangsu Yuyue Medical 
Equipment & Supply 
Private 100.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Romaco  
Pharmatechnik 
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Truking Technology Private 75.1 150.0 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Bosch Mahle  
Turbo Systems 
Automotive FountainVest Partners Private 100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
CP Tech Automotive Nedschroef / Shanghai 
Prime Machinery 
State-owned 90 5.3 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Finoba Automotive Automotive China National  
Machinery Industry 
Corp (Sinomach) 
State (SASAC) 100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Koller Gruppe Automotive Nanjing Nangang Iron & 
Steel United / Fosun  
International
Private Majority 
stake
n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Robert Bosch Starter 
Motors Generators 
Holding (SEG Automo-
tive Germany)
Automotive Zhengzhou Coal Mining 
Machinery Group / China 
Renaissance Capital  
Investment (CRCI) 
n / a 100.0 545.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Schürholz Gruppe Automotive Jiangsu Olive Sensors 
High-Tech
Private 32.0(a) 6.0(b) Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
TEG Technische Ent- 
wicklungsgesellschaft
Automotive Punch Power Train /  
Yinyi Investment  
Holding Group 
Private 100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Trimet Automotive 
Holding 
Automotive Shandong Binzhou  
Bohai Piston
State-owned 75.0 62.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
VEM Holding Automotive SEC Holding Private Majority 
stake
n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Duisburg Tubes  
Production 
Industry and  
machine tools
Taihai Manoir Nuclear 
Equipment 
n / a 100.0 n / a Energy systems
Gelpag Advanced  
Technology 
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Motic (Xiamen)  
Electric Group
Private 100.0 0.4 Energy systems
Manz CIGS  
Technology 
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Shanghai Electric 
Group / Shenhua Group
State-owned 100.0 50.0 Energy systems
mdexx Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Zhuzhou Lince Group Private 100.0 n / a Energy systems
Sea & Sun  
Technology 
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Zhonghuan TIG  
Meteorological  
Instruments 
State-owned 100.0 n / a Energy systems
WKS Group Energy and  
environmental 
technology
China Aerospace  
Science and Industry 
Corporation
State (SASAC) 20.0 n / a Energy systems
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SMA Railway  
Technology 
Electronics Beijing Dinghan  
Technology 
Private 100.0 23.0 Advanced railway equipment
Aluminiumwerk  
Unna 
Industry and  
machine tools
China Zhongwang  
Holding 
Private 99.7 75.0(b) Aerospace and aviation equipment
Flughafen  
Frankfurt-Hahn 
Transport and 
logistics
HNA Group Private 82.5 15.0 Aerospace and aviation equipment
Lilium Aerospace Tencent Holdings u. a. Private n / a n / a Aerospace and aviation equipment
SBM Development Aerospace Anhui Yingliu  
Electromechanical
Private 100.0 0.1 Aerospace and aviation equipment
M.A.i Industry and  
machine tools
Estun Automation Private 50.0 8.9 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Maschinenfabrik 
Lauffer
Industry and  
machine tools
Hefei Metalforming  
Intelligent  
Manufacturing
Private 100.0 24.0 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
PA Power Automation Industry and  
machine tools
Techmation (Taipei /  
Taiwan) / Ningbo  
Techmation
Private 19.9 3.3 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Benjamin Technology, media,  
telecommunica-
tions (TMT)
Henderson Group  
(Hong Kong)
Private 25.0 n / a New generation of information 
technologies
in-tech Technology, media,  
telecommunica-
tions (TMT)
Beijing BDStar  
Navigation
n / a 57.1 80.0 New generation of information 
technologies
ista International Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Cheung Kong Property 
Holdings / Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure Holdings
Private 100.0 5,776.0(b) New generation of information 
technologies
ZF Friedrichshafen 
(Global Body Control 
Systems and Radio  
Frequency Electronics 
divisions) 
Automotive Luxshare Precision  
Industry 
Private n / a n / a New generation of information 
technologies
Compositence Industry and  
machine tools
Qingdao Gon  
Technology
Private Majority 
stake
n / a New materials
Cotesa(c) Aerospace Advanced Technology & 
Materials / China Iron & 
Steel Research Institute
State (SASAC) Majority 
stake
100.0(b) New materials
Acura Klinken  
Baden-Baden
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Sino Great Wall Private Majority 
stake
n / a n / a
Bode Belting Industry and  
machine tools
AA Industrial Belting 
(Shanghai)
Private 49.0 1.5 n / a
Ehrfeld  
Mikrotechnik BTS 
Chemical industry Shaoxing Eastlake  
High-Tech 
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
EKOF Mining & Water 
Solution(d)
Chemical industry REFD HK Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Feuer Powertrain Automotive Tianjin Haowu Electro-
mechanical Automobile 
Trading
State-owned 50.0 n / a n / a
Grammer Automotive Ningbo Jifeng Auto Parts Private 25.5 n / a n / a
Reifen Schäfer Automotive China National  
Chemical Corporation  
(ChemChina) 
State-owned 
(SASAC)
n / a n / a n / a
RUSI Cosmetic Consumer goods HCP Holdings n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
SAM-Gruppe Consumer goods Kinen Sanitary Ware  
Industrial
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
SieMatic  
Möbelwerke 
Consumer goods Nison International  
Investment  
Management
n / a Majority 
stake
n / a n / a
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Vermes  
Microdispensing 
Industry and  
machine tools
Chaozhou  
Three-Circle Group
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
Deutsche Bank Finance HNA Group Private 9.9 3,310.0 n / a
NSM Packtec Industry and  
machine tools
Ningbo Lehui  
International  
Engineering Equipment 
Private 100.0 4.0 n / a
2016: 56 transactions
Axiogenesis Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Sino-German  
High-Tech Fund /  
Donghai Securities
Private 10.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Creative Balloons Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Well Lead Medical n / a 25.0 3.8 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Crelux Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
WuXi AppTec Private 100.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Fiagon Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Sino-German  
High-Tech Fund /  
Donghai Securities
Private n / a n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Gesellschaft für  
analytische  
Sensorsysteme
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Jinan Hanon  
Instruments
n / a 60.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
InflaRx Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Staidson (Beijing)  
Biopharmaceuticals
Private 16.3 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Transcatheter  
Technologies 
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Venus MedTech  
(HangZhou)
n / a n / a n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Carcoustics  
International
Automotive Liaoning Dare Industrial Private 100.0 200.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Fuba Automotive Electronics North Lingyun Industrial 
Group
State-owned 100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
LIMO Holding Electronics Focuslight  
Technologies Inc.
n / a 100.0 30.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Metalsa (formerly: ISE) 
Automotive 
Automotive SinoMach State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Sideo Vogt /  
Hermann Vogt
Automotive Shenzhen Kaizhong  
Precision Technology 
Private 100.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Technisat Digital  
(automotive division)
Automotive Joyson Electronics Private 100.0 236.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
TriStone Flowtech 
S.A.S.
Automotive Zhongding Sealing Parts Private 100.0 170.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Bilfinger Water  
Technology
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Chengdu Techcent  
Environment Group
Private 100.0 223.0 Energy systems
EEW Energy Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Beijing Enterprises 
Holding
State-owned 100.0 1,594.0 Energy systems
High Lux / Weier 
Antriebe und Energie-
technik 
Industry and  
machine tool
Jiangxi Special Electric 
Motor
Private n / a 2.8 Energy systems
Manz Industry and  
mechanical  
engineering
Shanghai Electric Group State-owned 19.7 53.0(b) Energy systems
RMG Messtechnik Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Dalian Energas Gas- 
System 
Private 100.0 n / a Energy systems
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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WindMW Energy and  
environmental 
technology
China Three Gorges State-owned 
(SASAC)
80.0 1,700.0 Energy systems
Windpark Butendiek Energy and  
environmental 
technology
CITIC / Itochu (Japan) n / a 22.5 n / a Energy systems
Bochumer Verein  
Verkehrstechnik (BVV)
Industry and  
machine tool
Full Hill Enterprises Private 100.0 > 100.0(b) Advanced railway equipment
CIDEON Engineering Industry and  
machine tool
China Railway  
Construction
State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a Advanced railway equipment
Rail Power Systems 
GmbH
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Tianjin Keyvia Electric 
Co., Ltd. 
Private 100.0 n / a Advanced railway equipment
Compo Consumer Consumer goods Kingenta Private 100.0 116.0 
– 132.2(b)
Agricultural machinery  
and equipment
Broetje-Automation Aerospace Shanghai Electric Group State-owned 100.0 174.0 Aerospace and aviation equipment
Göbler-Hirthmotoren Industry and  
machine tool
DEA General Aviation 
Holding
Private 100.0 4.5 
– 5.0(b)
Aerospace and aviation equipment
AMK Automotive Zhongding Sealing Parts Private 100.0 130.0 
– 147.6(b)
High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
ebu Umformtechnik Industry and  
machine tool
Xuzhou Metalforming 
Machine Group
Private 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Kleinknecht Industry and  
machine tool
China Everbright via 
BEPCO
State-owned(e) 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
KraussMaffei Industry and  
machine tool
ChemChina State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 1,012.0 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Kuka Industry and  
machine tool
Midea Private 94.5(f) 4,663.0(f) High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Wolf Holding Industry and  
machine tool
Shanghai Qiushi Invest-
ment & Assets Manage-
ment / Hunan Boyun 
New Materials
n / a 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Nordic Yards Shipyards Industry and  
machine tool
Genting Hongkong Private n / a 250.0 Maritime engineering equipment 
and high-tech maritime vessel 
manufacturing
Rockson Automation Industry and  
machine tool
Beijing Highlander  
Digital Technology 
Private 51.0 2.1 Maritime engineering equipment 
and high-tech maritime vessel 
manufacturing
hetras Deutschland Technology, media,  
telecommunications 
(TMT)
Beijing Shiji Information 
Technology
Private 100.0 n / a New generation of information 
technologies
METRIC mobility  
solutions 
Technology, media,  
telecommunications 
(TMT)
Dutech Holdings n / a n / a 3.0 New generation of information 
technologies
Smaato Technology, media,  
telecommunications 
(TMT)
Spearhead Private 100.0 142.0 New generation of information 
technologies
ItN Nanovation Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Shanghai SafBon  
Investment
n / a 67.7 4.0 New materials
Scholz Holding Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Chiho-Tiande Group Private n / a n / a New materials
ALBA SE (China  
business and  
services segment)
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Chengdu Techcent  
Environment
Private each 
60.0
300.0 n / a
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Ayanda A / S (Softgel  
division / Ayanda GmbH 
& Co. KG)
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Sirio Pharma Private n / a n / a n / a
Bameta Industry and  
machine tool
GEM n / a 30.0 5.2 n / a
Bigpoint Technology, media,  
telecommunications 
(TMT)
Youzu Interactive Private 100.0 80.0 n / a
Dürr  
(cleaning division)
Industry and  
machine tool
Shenyang Blue Silver 
Group
Private 85.0 120.0 n / a
Elgato Systems  
(Eye TV division) 
Technology, media,  
telecommunications 
(TMT)
Geniatech Inc. n / a n / a n / a n / a
EuRec Environmental 
Technology
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Jiangsu WELLE  
Environmental 
Private 70.0 n / a n / a
GLP German Light 
Products(g)
Electronics Fujian Ji’aipu Lightning  
Technology
n / a 100.0 9.0 n / a
Mr von Gimborn Consumer goods Hillhouse Capital  
Management
Private 100.0 n / a n / a
HPTec(h) Industry and  
machine tool
China Tungsten and 
Hightech Material
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
Industrial Acoustics 
(German subsidiary  
of a US company)
Industry and  
machine tool
Beijing Greentec  
Acoustic
Private n / a n / a n / a
Osram (light saving  
division) / Ledvance
Electronics IDG Capital Partners /  
MLS / Yiwu State-Owned 
Assets Operation Center 
n / a 100.0 400.0 n / a
Schäfer HPS  
(high pressure  
technology division)
Industry and  
machine tool
Beijing Huahai  
Machinery Corporation 
Private n / a n / a n / a
Schimmel Consumer goods Guangzhou Pearl  
River Piano
State-owned 90.0 24.0 n / a
Skil Elektrowerkzeuge 
(Robert Bosch GmbH)
Consumer goods Chervon Holdings Private n / a n / a n / a
WITA Wilhelm Taake Industry and  
machine tool
Shimge Pump  
Industry Group
Private 100.0 9.0 n / a
2015: 37 transactions
Bendalis Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Hainan Shuangcheng 
Pharma
Private 74.9 29.0 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Cardionovum Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Grand Pharma &  
Healthcare / Shanghai 
Muyi Investment
Private 73.0 67.8 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
IMD Natural Solutions 
GmbH
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Zhejiang Hisun  
Pharmaceutical
State-owned 21.0 4.0 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
KTB Tumorforschungs-
gesellschaft
Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
China Equity Group Private 100.0 n / a Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Lyomark Pharma Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Hainan Shuangcheng 
Pharma
Private 74.9 10.0 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
Medisana Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Xiamen Comfort Science 
& Technology Group
Private n / a 26.2 Biomedicine and high- 
performance medical devices
EFA-S Automotiv Beijing Zhonghuan  
Investment  
Management
n / a 75.0 n / a Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Waldaschaff  
Automotive
Automotiv North Lingyun Industrial 
Group
State-owned 100.0 7.0 Energy-saving and  
new-energy vehicles
Apt Hiller Industry and  
machine tools
Sedant Group Private 75.0 n / a Energy systems
Soitec SA (Freiburg  
production plant)
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Suncore Photovoltaics /  
Fujian San’an  
Optoelectronics
Private n / a n / a Energy systems
Krauth Technology Industry and  
machine tools
Dutech Holdings /  
Tri Star Holding
n / a n / a n / a Advanced railway equipment
HAWE Inline Hydraulik Industry and  
machine tools
Jiangsu Hengli High- 
pressure Oil Cylinder
Private 100.0 n / a Agricultural machinery  
and equipment
Xtremeair Aerospace DEA General Aviation 
Holding
Private 100.0 3.6 Aerospace and aviation equipment
Lloyd Werft Bremer-
haven / Lloyd Investi-
tions- und Verwaltungs-
gesellschaft
Transport and 
logistics
Genting Hongkong Private 70.0 / 
50.0
18.0 Maritime engineering equipment 
and high-tech maritime vessel 
manufacturing
WEGU Holding Automotiv Zhongding Sealing Parts Private 100.0 95.0 New materials
KSL Kuttler Automati-
sation Systems(i)
Industry and  
machine tools
Suzhou Fountain Group n / a 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
OHE Mining  
Technology
Industry and  
machine tools
Beijing Huahai  
Machinery Corporation
Private 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Stoll Industry and  
machine tools
SGSB Group Private 26.0 28.5 
– 109.6(b)
High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Whitesell Germany Automotive Nedschroef B. V. / Shang-
hai Prime Machinery
State-owned n / a n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Baden Baden  
Cosmetics Group
Consumer goods DY Affluent Fund  
Management
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
Beltco Systems Industry and  
machine tools
Shanghai Yongli Belting Private 45.0 0.5 n / a
Berkenhoff Industry and  
machine tools
Powerway Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Carl Mertens  
International
Consumer goods Sichuan Liuhe Forging Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Compo Expert Chemical industry Xio Group (London /  
Shanghai / Hong Kong)
Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Corsina Europe Textiles and  
clothing
Hop Lun (Hong Kong) Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Hauck & Aufhäuser  
Privatbankiers
Finance Fosun International Private 80.0 210.0 
– 262.5(b)
n / a
HG Sales Textiles and  
clothing
Royal Spirit (Hong Kong) n / a n / a n / a n / a
Jobspotting Technology, media,  
telecommunica-
tions (TMT)
Horizons Ventures 
(Hong Kong)
Private n / a 0.5 n / a
MBVG (subsidiary  
of Ostdeutschland 
Daimler AG)
Automotiv Lei Shing Hong  
(Hong Kong)
Private n / a n / a n / a
Nordic Hotels Hotel and  
gastronomy
Louvre Hotels  
(Jin Jing International)
State-owned n / a n / a n / a
Quin Automotiv Joyson Electronics Private 75.0 90.0 n / a
Rheintal Klinik Pharmaceuticals,  
biotechnology and 
health
Huapont Life Sciences Private 100.0 6.0 n / a
Triumph (Dorina) Textiles and  
clothing
Hop Lun (Hong Kong) Private n / a n / a n / a
HAT Hauser Trucks Transport and 
logistics
TIP Trailer Services  
Germany / HNA Group
Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Lamberet Deutschland Automotiv AVIC / Xinfei Group State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a n / a
Metz Werke Electronics Skyworth Holdings Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Vincenz Wiederholt Industry and  
machine tools
Zhongding Sealing Parts Private 100.0 n / a n / a
2014: 35 transactions
Alterprodia Automotive Ningbo Huaxiang  
Electronic
Private 75.0 0.9 Energy-saving and new-energy  
vehicles
Hilite International 
(part of hydraulics  
division of Siemens)
Automotive AVIC State-owned 
(SASAC)
n / a 473.0 Energy-saving and new-energy  
vehicles
KACO Automotive Zhongding Sealing Parts Private 80.0 64.0 Energy-saving and new-energy  
vehicles
Kokinetics Automotive AVIC State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a Energy-saving and new-energy  
vehicles
KS Aluminium- 
Technologie
Automotive Huayu Automotive  
Systems / SAIC
State-owned n / a n / a Energy-saving and new-energy  
vehicles
Avancis Energy and  
environmental 
technology
China National Building 
Group (CNBM)
State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a Energy systems
S. A. G. Solarstrom Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Shunfeng Photovoltaik 
International
Private 100.0 65.0
 – 153.0(b)
Energy systems
SGL Rotec Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Beijing Better Life Private 100.0 n / a Energy systems
Solutronic Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Shanghai ChuRui Energy 
Technology
Private 100.0 n / a Energy systems
Sunways (solar inverter 
and BIPV division)(j)
Energy and  
environmental 
technology
Shunfeng International 
Clean Energy
Private n / a n / a Energy systems
TLT-Turbo  
(part of ventilators  
division of Siemens)
Industry and  
machine tools
Power Construction 
Corporation of China
State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a Energy systems
Lübeck Airport Transport and 
logistics
Puren Group Private 100.0 n / a Aerospace systems
Falcom Wireless  
Communications
Technology, media,  
telecommunica-
tions (TMT)
Maestro Wireless Solu-
tions Ltd (Hong Kong)
Private n / a n / a New generation of information 
technologies
Renesas Electronics  
Europe (Display division)
Electronics Tianma Microelectronics n / a 100.0 n / a New generation of information 
technologies
Boge Elastmetall Automotive Zhuzhou Times New  
Material Technology
n / a 100.0 315.0 New materials
Deutsche Mechatronics Industry and  
machine tools
Tri Star Holding n / a 54.5 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Heidelberger Druck 
(Post-press Packaging 
division)
Industry and  
machine tools
Masterwork Machinery Private 100.0 17.0 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
IMA Automation  
Amberg
Industry and  
machine tools
Joyson Electronics Private 100.0 20.0 High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
Künkel-Wagner  
Prozesstechnologie
Industry and  
machine tools
QME Qingdao  
Machinery Industry
State-owned 100.0 n / a High-end numerical control  
machinery and robotics
BHF Bank Finance Fosun International Private 19.2 98.5 n / a
Columbus Holding /  
Cybex
Consumer goods Goodbaby International 
Holding (Hong Kong)
Private 100.0 70.7 n / a
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Koki Techni  
Transmission Systems
Automotive AVIC State-owned 
(SASAC)
100.0 n / a n / a
M-Tec Mathis Technik Industry and  
machine tools
Zoomlion Heavy  
Industry
State-owned n / a 41.0 n / a
miacom diagnostics Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and 
health
Fosun International /  
Shanghai Fosun  
Pharmaceutical
Private 37.0 n / a n / a
Peine Textiles and  
clothing
Shandong Ruyi Sciences 
& Technology
Private 51.0 n / a n / a
Penta Hotel Holdings Hotel and  
gastronomy
New World China Land 
(Hong Kong)
Private 100.0 13.5 n / a
Russ & Janot Automotive Lei Shing Hong  
(Hong Kong)
Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Schumag Industry and  
machine tools
Meibah International Private 54.6 2.8 n / a
Selig & Böttcher Industry and  
machine tools
TK Mold Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Tom Tailor Holding Textiles and  
clothing
Fosun International Private 23.2 87.5 n / a
WACO Industry and  
machine tools
Jiangsu Hengli Highpres-
sure Oil Cylinder
Private 51.0 0.3 n / a
Weingut Diehl-Blees Agriculture Jiangsu GPRO Group Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Wilbert Turmkrane Industry and  
machine tools
Nanyang Guoyu Seal  
Development
n / a 100.0 n / a n / a
Zenith Maschinenfabrik Industry and  
machine tools
Fujian Quangong  
Machinery 
Private 100.0 n / a n / a
Ziegler Automotive China Fire Safety  
Enterprise Group
Private 40.0 56 .0
– 140.0(b)
n / a
(a) In each case in three companies of the Schürholz Group.
(b) Estimate taken from the sources used or indication of different transaction value in various sources.
(c) The investment in Cotesa was agreed in 2017. According to the involved law firm Orrick, however, it was the first Chinese investment in a German company to be  
reviewed on the basis of the amendment to the German Foreign Trade Act and was only approved in April 2018 by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
(Orrick, 27 April 2018). 
(d) EKOF Mining and Water Solution has been owned by Chinese investors since 2013.
(e) The investment was made indirectly through the China Investment Corporation via Central Huijin Investment.
(f) In 2016, the Chinese investor increased its stake from 5.43 to 94.5 percent. The reported transaction value refers to the investment as a whole.
(g) GLP German Light Products was already owned by Chinese investors before.
(h) HPTec was already owned by Chinese investors before.
(i) KSL Kuttler Automation Systems has been owned by Chinese investors since 2008.
(j) Sunways has been owned by Chinese investors since 2012
Target  
company
Sector Chinese  
investor
Majority  
ownership type 
of investor
Percentage 
(per cent)
Transaction 
value (EUR 
million)
MIC 2025  
key sector
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Explanatory notes on the dataset used for Chinese M & A 
transactions in Germany:
The dataset contains a total of 175 Chinese M & A trans- 
actions in Germany between 2014 and 2017, which could  
be verified by means of publicly available information such as 
company announcements, industry reports or press releases. 
It is based on a dataset that was already used in the study 
Challenge and Opportunity. Chinese Direct Investments in  
Germany by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2016 and included 
99 Chinese investments in Germany (see Jungbluth 2016: 
8–10, 40). 
The dataset was updated with the author’s own research for 
this study. In addition, M & A transactions with stakes of ten 
percent or more were systematically recorded. According 
to the international standard definition, a direct investment 
above this level is assumed to have a long-term motivation  
and is usually combined with the investor’s expectation to gain 
a controlling interest in the company (UNCTAD 2016: 3; 79). 
Exception: The HNA Group’s investment in Deutsche Bank is 
9.9 percent and thus slightly below the ten percent threshold. 
However, it is so close to this value that it has been taken into 
account here. 
If available, the dataset provides information on the German 
target company, the percentage of the Chinese investment 
and the transaction value. Where only estimates of the trans-
action value or goodwill were available in the sources used, 
they were adopted and identified with (b).
Wherever possible, the type of ownership was provided for 
Chinese investors. A distinction is made between private 
and state-owned companies. This information was provided 
in those cases where it was identified that a majority of the 
shares (> 50 percent) were privately- or state-owned. This 
can be seen in the annual reports of publicly listed compa-
nies, some of which are only available in Chinese. Chinese pri-
vately owned companies sometimes describe themselves as 
such on their corporate websites (minying qiye). In addition, the 
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) pub-
lishes the “China Top 500 Private Enterprises” every year (see, 
for example, ACFIC, 25 August 2016). In addition, there are 
special awards in China for privately owned companies and 
private entrepreneurs. This publicly available information in 
many cases helps to identify the type of ownership of Chinese 
investors. 
Companies that are controlled by the State-owned Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and 
thus directly by the central government in Beijing, i. e. the 
so-called Yangqi (for more details in this regard, see: Jungbluth 
2016: 40) are a separate category. At the present time, there 
are 97 companies on a list available at the SASAC website 
(SASAC, 29 December 2017).
The entry n.d. (no data) in regard to the form of ownership 
means that either no information is available on the type of 
ownership or both state-owned and private investors were 
involved in the transaction (e.g. in a consortium) or no clear 
private or state majority could be identified. In general, the 
state may or may not hold a stake in companies where the 
majority of the company is privately owned (for details on the 
types of ownership at Chinese companies, see Szepan 2016: 
198–222).
The 175 Chinese M & A transaction were matched with  
the ten MIC 2025 key sectors for this study. This matching 
is based on an analysis by Prognos AG on behalf of the Ber-
telsmann Stiftung, which was supplemented and updated by 
the author’s own research and by research of Felix Vemmer, 
NOVA School of Business and Economics, Lisbon. The basis  
for the classification was the Chinese government’s core  
document “Made in China 2025” (State Council, 8 May 2015), 
the Orbis company database and publicly available informa-
tion on the analyzed companies (company websites, annual 
reports, industry services, commercial register, etc.). An 
M & A transaction was assigned to MIC 2025 if the business 
area of the German target company could be fully or partially 
matched with one of the ten MIC 2025 sectors.
The table lists the M & A transaction, first by year, then alpha-
betically by assignment to the MIC 2025 sectors and finally by 
the name of the German target company. If no assignment to 
MIC 2025 has been made, the order is alphabetical according 
to the name of the German target company.
The most important sources serving as the basis for the com-
pilation of Chinese M & A transaction in Germany between 
2014 and 2017 are listed in alphabetical order: EY 2017: 14 
and 2018:14; Ginkgo Tree Advisors 2014: 12 and 2015: 6–8; 
Jungbluth 2016: 8–10; M & A China/Deutschland 01/2017: 
10–11; M & A China/Deutschland 01/2018: 10–11.
The compilation does not claim to be complete.
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FIGURE 10: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany fitting MIC 2025 – individual years: 2014 (in percent)
FIGURE 11: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany fitting MIC 2025 – individual years: 2015 (in percent)
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
  MIC 2025: 
19 M&A transactions
31.6%  Electrical equipment
 2.,3% Energy-saving and 
new-energy vehicles
 21.1% High-end numerical 
control machinery 
and robotics
 10.5% Next-generation 
information technology
 5.3% Aerospace and 
aviation equipment
 5.3% New materials
35 M&A transactions
54.3% Yes, fits MIC 2025 
45.7% No, does not fit MIC 2025
 
  MIC 2025: 
19 M&A transactions
31.6% Biomedicine and 
high-performance 
medical devices
 21.1% High-end numerical 
control machinery 
and robotics
 10.5% Electrical equipment
 10.5% Energy-saving and 
new-energy vehicles
 5.3% Advanced railway equipment
 5.3% Agricultural machinery 
and equipment
 5.3% Aerospace and aviation 
equipment
 5.3% Maritime engineering 
equipment and high-tech 
maritime vessel manufacturing
 5.3% New materials
 37 M&A transactions
51.4% Yes, fits MIC 2025 
48.6% No, does not fit MIC 2025 
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FIGURE 12: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany fitting MIC 2025 – individual years: 2016 (in percent)
FIGURE 13: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany fitting MIC 2025 – individual years: 2017 (in percent)
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
  MIC 2025: 
40 M&A transactions
 17.5% Electrical equipment
 17.5% Biomedicine and 
high-performance 
medical devices
 17.5% Energy-saving and 
new-energy vehicles
 15.0% High-end numerical 
control machinery 
and robotics
 7.5% Advanced railway equipment
 7.5% Next-generation 
information technology
 5.0% Maritime engineering 
equipment and high-tech 
maritime vessel manufacturing
 5.0% Aerospace and 
aviation equipment
 5.0% New materials
 2.5% Agricultural machinery 
and equipment 
 56 M&A transactions
72.7% Yes, fits MIC 2025 
27.3% No, does not fit MIC 2025 
  MIC 2025: 
34 M&A transactions 
26.5% Energy-saving and 
new-energy vehicles
 17.6% Electrical equipment
 14.7% Biomedicine and 
high-performance 
medical devices
 11.8% Next-generation 
information technology
 11.8% Aerospace and 
aviation equipment
 8.8% High-end numerical 
control machinery 
and robotics
 5.9% New materials
 2.9% Advanced railway 
equipment
 47 M&A transactions
72.3% Yes, fits MIC 2025 
27.7% No, does not fit MIC 2025
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FIGURE 14: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany by type of ownership, 2014–2017 – individual years (in percent)
FIGURE 15: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany by sector, 2014–2017 (in percent)
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
 66% Private 
 14% State (SASAC) 
 11% n.d.
 9% State-owned 
2014:
35 transactions
2015: 
37 transactions
2016: 
56 transactions
2017: 
47 transactions
 73% Private 
 14% n.d. 
 11% State-owned 
 3% State (SASAC) 
 59% Private 
 23% n.d.
 11% State-owned
 7% State (SASAC)
 62% Private 
 19% n.d.
 11% State-owned
 8% State (SASAC)
 26.9% Industry and machine tools 
 20.0% Automotive  
 12.6% Energy and environmental 
technology
 12.6% Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and health
 7.4% Other 
 5.7% Consumer goods 
 5.1% “Technology, media, 
Telecommunications (TMT)” 
 4.0% Electronics 
 2.9% Aerospace 
 2.9% Textiles and clothing 
37
Is China Systematically Buying Up Key Technologies? 
FIGURE 16: Chinese M & A transactions in Germany by sector, individual years: 2014–2017 (in percent)
Source: Author’s own research and compilation. For detailed information see explanatory notes on the dataset used in the annex.	
 31.4% Industry and 
machine tools 
 25.7% Automotive 
 14.3% Energy and 
environmental 
technology
 5.7% Textiles and clothing
 2.9% Electronics
 2.9% Finance
 2.9% Hotel and gastronomy
 2.9% Consumer goods
 2.9% Agriculture 
 2.9% Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology 
and health
 2.9% ”Technology, media, 
Telecommunications 
(TMT)“
 2.9% Transport and logistics
 24.3% Industry and 
machine tools 
 18.9% Automotive 
18.9% Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology 
and health
 8.1% Textiles and clothing
 5.4% Consumer goods
 5.4% Transport and logistics
 2.7% Chemical industry
 2.7% Energy and 
environmental 
technology
 2.7% Electronics
 2.7% Finance
 2.7% Hotel and gastronomy
 2.7% Aerospace
 2.7% ”Technology, media, 
Telecommunications 
(TMT)“
32.1% Industry and 
machine tools
 17.9% Energy and 
environmental 
technology
14.3% Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology 
and health
 10.7% Automotive 
 8.9% ”Technology, media, 
Telecommunications 
(TMT)“
 7.1% Electronics
 7.1% Consumer goods
 1.8% Aerospace
 
 27.7% Automotive 
 19.1% Industry and 
machine tools 
 12.8% Energy and 
environmental 
technology
 12.8% Pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology 
and health
 6.4% Consumer goods
 6.4% Aerospace
 4.3% Chemical industry
 4.3% ”Technology, media, 
Telecommunications 
(TMT)“
 2.1% Electronics
 2.1% Finance
 2.1% Transport and logistics
2014
35 transaction
2015: 
37 transaction
2016: 
56 transaction
2017: 
47 transaction
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